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Overview 
Flexi-super is a proposal to allow people to begin receiving New Zealand 
Superannuation (NZS) between the ages of 60 and 70, instead of at age 65 as at 
present. The intention is that the rate at which NZS was paid commencing at these 
ages would be adjusted relative to age 65 rates.  
A discussion document on this topic was issued by the Government late August 2013. 
This paper is not a direct response to that publication, having been commenced at an 
earlier stage in the light of some earlier canvassing of the concept. It does not 
therefore address all the matters raised in the discussion document, but does set out 
three distinct grounds for not proceeding any further. 
The first section of the paper describes the policy currently underpinning NZS, and 
outlines why Flexi-super is fundamentally at odds with it. The discussion identifies a 
crucial misconception that appears to have grown up around NZS, and which needs to 
be dispelled.   
A second section, the most comprehensive of the paper, covers the technical 
considerations in respect of pricing of the relativity for early uptake (that is, what 
lower proportion of age 65 NZS could be paid from age 60) and the relativity for 
deferral (that is, what higher proportion of age 65 NZS could be paid consequential on 
deferral to age 70). As deferral is highly likely to provide individuals with the 
opportunity for savings on their income tax, an allowance is made for this cost. 
The technical considerations stress the need to establish the longevity characteristics 
of the “target” clientele. The sensitivity of the results to the assumed rate of discount 
in excess of wage indexation is also apparent. The early uptake relativity of 73% 
proposed in the Government discussion paper looks to be of the right order (75% is 
suggested here) but the discussion paper relativity for deferral of 160% turns out to be 
far too high; something of the order of 125% is appropriate under a cost-neutral 
constraint and a realistic view of appropriate discount rates. 
Although tentative conclusions are arrived at as to what the relativities might be on a 
theoretically cost-neutral basis, the process makes it clear that no great precision 
looking forward 30 or so years is likely to be obtained. There is therefore a not 
insignificant risk associated even with a “best-estimate” calculation, and it is unclear 
why one would make risk-sensitive changes to a welfare program already under cost 
pressures as the population ages. 
The third section discusses “choice”. Firstly, drawing on basic insurance tenets of 
adverse selection, the strain on cost neutrality that will occur from exercise of rational 
choice is described.  This is followed by the argument that those for whom early 
uptake may appear attractive are not in fact likely to enjoy choice in any meaningful 
sense of the word. Finally, the impact of the way many individuals tend to assess the 
future (as opposed to a rational agent model) is briefly outlined to argue that deferral 
in particular will in practice be seen as desirable by only a few, unless cost-neutral 
pricing is discarded.     
The issues of people wanting to defer receipt of NZS due to remaining in paid 
employment and not needing it at that time, and the need for income support in the 
years up to NZS commencement, are not negligible.  These however could be 
addressed to a greater or lesser extent by means of some enhancements to KiwiSaver, 
as set out in a brief fourth section. 
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The concluding remarks review the paper’s findings and arguments, and express 
concern that the concept was ever taken seriously as a policy option.  
 
Section 1: Conceptual Basis for NZ Superannuation 
Behind the idea that one can choose the age at which New Zealand Superannuation 
commences is a concept that NZS is an individual entitlement, a pot of money if you 
will. This is unambiguously wrong.  
The object of NZS, simply put, is to ensure all NZ residents above a certain age 
(currently 65) have sufficient income to be able to participate in society, to at least a 
certain minimum acceptable extent
1
. The level of NZS is therefore intentionally above 
that which might be considered necessary to alleviate poverty, certainly in the sense 
of destitution.  
NZS is very successful in this goal in fact, and ranks very highly in international 
comparisons of social security systems (depending however where the comparator is 
set). Domestically far fewer of our over-65 population are in poverty (as measured by 
standard of living surveys) compared to families (parents with children under 18). 
Behind this policy lies an egalitarian solidarity which requires a minimum equal 
income to be provided to each and every older New Zealander as of right
2
. It takes the 
form of an income stream, expressed in statute.  
A change in statute can change the income, and indeed this has happened at different 
times in the past. A change can be challenged politically, but it cannot be challenged 
legally, because there is no property right; that is, there is no entitlement enforceable 
in a court of law. 
There are of course some countries offering flexibility of eligibility age and an 
adjustment in pension payments. However, most of these, such as Sweden, feature an 
individual pension entitlement based on individual contributions. Only Ireland is like 
New Zealand in having a straightforward level universal pension, and Ireland offers 
no flexibility. The UK is moving towards a flat rate pension (operating alongside a 
voluntary but strongly tax-favoured private pension system) and has a deferral 
arrangement which permits any pension not taken to be accumulated, and paid later 
either as a taxed lump sum or as additional pension. The Australian means-tested flat-
rate pension, which operates alongside tax-favoured compulsory superannuation 
savings, can also be deferred. Neither of these state pension schemes are strictly 
comparable to New Zealand, and neither offer early pension at a reduced level. 
For completeness one should record there are issues in respect of the affordability of 
NZS, important to its continuation. These are not however the focus here, and Flexi-
super does not purport to address them in any case.  
                                                        
1 Refer the Royal Commission of Inquiry 1972:65: “beneficiaries to enjoy a standard of living “much 
like” that of the rest of the community and which would enable them to participate in and belong to 
the community”. This was further supported in the 1988 Royal Commission on Social Policy. It may be 
noted that the extent to which this conceptual approach has been applied to benefits other than NZS 
is arguable. 
2 One of the ways New Zealand exercises the solidarity principle is to require NZS to be offset by any 
social security pension received by a NZ superannuitant from another country. This is logical in terms 
of the policy objective of NZS, but again runs counter to the idea of a pension pot, which may be why 
some confusion exists on this aspect of NZS policy as well. 
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In summary, there is no legal or moral foundation for the idea of an individual 
pension pot giving rise to exercise of choice.  Further, the core principle and purpose 
of NZS would disappear were any group to receive a lower amount of benefit than 
others, or were any group to receive more. 
 
Section 2: Technical Issues 
A: Background, methodology and assumptions 
As already observed, Flexi-super is based on the mistaken idea that there are 
individual entitlements to a stream of income. But even were entitlement to current 
NZS to constitute some form of property right
3
, there are technical problems inherent 
in setting a uniform age-by-age relativity to age 65 rates.  
Setting a relative rate according to age of commencement requires comparing the 
value of different income streams from a consistent date. The standard approach is to 
make a best estimate of each income stream, and then to determine the current sum 
that when appropriately invested would be exactly enough to support those payments. 
The relativity will then follow from equating the current sums at the same point in 
time. 
In this paper I calculate the relativity for anticipating NZS at age 60 in place of age 65 
and the relativity for deferring NZS from age 65 to age 70 under different 
assumptions as to future economic and demographic conditions. The relativity is 
expressed as the percentage reduction or addition to the age 65 rate of payment. 
The relativities are determined by calculating the value at age 60 of (1) a wage-
indexed annuity payable from age 60; (2) a wage-indexed annuity deferred five years 
and commencing at age 65; and (3) a wage-indexed annuity deferred 10 years and 
commencing at age 70.  
The relativity for early uptake is given by (2) divided by (1); the relativity for deferral 
by (2) divided by (3). A variant of (2), referred to as (2A), assumes the NZS payment 
is taxed at the maximum rate of 33c in the $ for the first 5 years (65 to 70), in place of 
the approximate 11c in the $ without other income, since deferral may be attractive 
for tax reasons. The relativity adjusted for maximum tax savings is then given by (2A) 
divided by (3). Formulae are set out in Appendix 1. 
There are three rates of NZS that may be received by an individual: half married rate, 
single rate, single plus living alone rate. Half married rates are adjusted each year on a 
net of tax basis, relativities for single and single living alone are then preserved, and 
then all three are grossed up, assuming no other income. To be consistent, the early 
uptake/deferral relativities will need to be applied to the relevant age 65 net rate and 
grossed up, noting however this will add to computational complexity. 
The two principal assumptions relevant to valuation are:  
1. The discount rate, net of tax, after allowing for future NZS indexation; indexation 
is currently the greater of annual price inflation and growth in national average 
ordinary time earnings.  
                                                        
3 It may be that some misplaced concept of an enforceable entitlement underpins the current 
Government refusal to contemplate any increase in the NZS eligibility age, although this has not been 
made explicit. If it is so, it is in contradiction to the Government’s attitude to other forms of social 
security. 
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2. Probability of survival to receive a payment, commencing from the valuation date. 
Discount rates: appropriate discount rates are likely to change over time, and hence 
the early uptake/deferral relativities will need to be kept under review. In the UK, 
a revision downwards has just been made to their deferment provisions as the 
result of the previous rates having been set in a high interest rate environment. In 
this instance those in the UK who deferred before the revision have been 
advantaged. 
NZS payments as noted will increase in line with wage growth (underpinned by 
inflation growth). Looking ahead an average of something along the lines of 3-
3.5% increase pa in payments might reasonably be assumed, under stable 
conditions
4
.  
The investments one would want to hold to generate a risk-free return over the 
periods in question (in excess of 30 years), including a hedge against wage 
growth, do not exist
5
.  Taking into account some level of tax on investment 
income, and the cost of the risk arising from the lack of assets to match liabilities, 
one might conservatively use a discount of 0%. At the other extreme, and 
assuming a move to a high interest rate economy, one might optimistically use a 
discount rate of 3% pa.  
As will be shown, relativities are quite sensitive to the chosen discount rate. A 
high discount makes payments in the near future a lot more valuable than those 
later, so that deferral appears to confer significant advantage. Conversely 
bringing payments forward (ie early uptake) appears more valuable the higher the 
discount. The ability of most individuals to make a sensible judgement on an 
appropriate discount is of course very limited; it is not a thing they have to do 
every day, particularly in relation to a wage-indexed series of payments. 
In my view a discount of 0% pa (ie assuming risk free returns, less tax, are close 
to wage growth) is more realistic at the present time, but I provide results from 
using a 3% pa discount to enable appreciation of the sensitivity to the relationship 
between wage indexing and net of tax risk-free returns. 
Probability of survival: this is derived from mortality rates, which have three 
dimensions: 
 Gender  
 Socio-economic status 
 The extent of future improvement (ie decrease in current observed rates) to 
be allowed for. 
Difference in gender is apparent from NZ population mortality tables. For all 
population, the 2010-2012 tables
6
 show male life expectancy at age 65 of 18.84 
                                                        
4 The NZ Treasury in its 2013 long term fiscal model assumes 2% pa price inflation and 1.5% pa real 
labour force productivity growth, and hence about 3.5% pa NZS growth long term; rates in the short 
term average about 3.1% pa. 
5 It has been argued that the ability to tax increases in wages presents a natural hedge for 
Government. Future tax receipts are not however usually regarded as an asset class for good and 
proper reasons, and no government to the author’s knowledge has ever issued wage-indexed 
securities, even though these would be of considerable benefit to private defined benefit pension 
schemes. 
6 Statistics New Zealand 2010-212 life tables, while based on actual deaths over 2010 to 2012 as the 
numerator, necessarily use estimates of the population as the denominator in the absence of census 
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years, compared to female life expectancy of 21.22 years, a difference of 2.38 
years.
7
 
Difference in mortality due to difference in socio-economic status (SES) has 
been established convincingly in a number of countries
8
. No specific results are 
available in NZ, but research into NZ mortality rates by Blakely et al and 
published in the “Decades of Disparity” series,  where death records were 
matched to census data, has brought out a strong relationship between ethnicity 
and socio-economic status (SES).  
Accordingly I use published mortality rates for Māori and non- Māori as proxies 
for low and high socio-economic status groups. This is likely to be conservative 
as non-Māori rates include some lower SES non-Māori lives, and Māori rates 
include some higher SES Māori lives. The difference in period life expectancy 
for males between higher SES and lower SES on this approach is 3.8 years, and 
for females 4.6 years. 
Finally, mortality improvement is the extent to which mortality will decrease in 
the future, both generally, and within the dimensions of gender and SES. The last 
30 years have seen sustained decreases in mortality rates at all ages, both by 
gender and by socio-economic status – although differentiated within these 
sectors.  
Improvement is relevant here because it extends the period over which the 
annuity will be paid, while the deferral or anticipation period remains fixed. 
Failure to allow for mortality improvement would give rise to a lower early 
uptake relativity, and a higher deferral relativity, than would be correct. 
What the future will hold for mortality improvement is a matter of conjecture and 
dispute. Continued improvement is generally assumed, but the extent of this, and 
the effect of gender and SES differences, is yet to be fully founded on hard 
science. As a rule of thumb, a compound decrease in mortality rates of 1% pa at 
all ages into the future is a not uncommon broad-brush assumption, and may even 
be considered as too low in some quarters
9
.  
I explored two approaches:  
 improvement in mortality acting in such a way as to maintain existing 
differences in period (unimproved) life expectancy; for example, assuming 
the mortality rate of the higher SES groups decreases at a compound rate of 
1% pa into the future requires lower SES groups to show a higher compound 
decrease of 1.20% pa (males) and 1.175% pa (females) for the existing 
differences by SES and gender to be maintained 
 the same absolute improvement in mortality for each SES group; for example, 
assuming the improvement in mortality for the higher SES group to be 1.5% 
pa compound, and that the same absolute decrease in mortality occurs for the 
lower SES group, gives rise to a widening in life expectancy between higher 
and lower SES groups, from 4.4 to 5.3 years for males, and 4.8 to 5.7 for 
females 
                                                                                                                                                              
information delayed by the Christchurch earthquake. They show greater relative improvement in 
male mortality than in female mortality.  
7 These are period life expectancies, assuming no change in mortality rates in future years. 
8 For example Johnson and Langford & Johnson in the UK, and Monk et al in the US. 
9
 For a comprehensive discussion in the NZ context refer O’Connell. 
6 
 
In practice, early uptake/deferral results were very similar on both approaches. I 
have therefore adopted the first approach, ie assuming future improvement will 
occur around 1% pa compound, but be a little higher for the lower SES groups so 
as to preserve current period differences in life expectancy according to gender 
and SES group.   
The comparison of annuity values is based on people aged 60, and hence the 
deferral calculations for age 65 necessarily have 5 years of mortality 
improvement included. I have however checked what the relativities for deferral 
from age 65 would be for people currently aged 65, and results are very similar.  
 
B: Results and findings 
The annuity factors are given in Appendix 2. The consequential early uptake/deferral 
percentages are tabulated below for each combination of discount rate, gender, and 
SES, including the relativity % adjusted for maximum potential tax saving.  
Table 1: relativities by discount, gender and SES 
  
Early uptake  (60 
instead of 65) 
Deferral  
(70 instead of 65) 
Deferral after tax 
saving 
0
%
 
d
isco
u
n
t 
Male high SES 80.2% 130.8% 123.2% 
Male low SES 76.6% 138.1% 128.7% 
Female high SES 82.1% 126.8% 120.2% 
Female low SES 78.3% 134.1% 125.7% 
3
%
 
d
isco
u
n
t 
Male high SES 72.9% 144.1% 133.2% 
Male low SES 69.1% 153.3% 140.1% 
Female high SES 74.7% 139.4% 129.7% 
Female low SES 70.7% 148.6% 136.6% 
 
It is clear from Table 1 that there are a wide range of possible early uptake/deferral 
percentages according to assumed discount rate and assumed mortality characteristics, 
and that tax saving is significant.  
Discount rate: averaging all results according to the discount rate assumed gives an 
early uptake relativity of 79% under the zero discount rate assumption (the first 
4 rows), compared to 72% for the 3% discount rate (the last 4 rows). The 
corresponding average deferral relativities ignoring tax effects are 133% and 
146%. As noted in the discussion on choice of discount rate, the effect of using 
a non-zero discount is to place a relatively higher value on payments closer to 
the valuation date, so that for early uptake of NZS the later instalments are 
devalued relative to the immediate age 60 payments. Similarly, the use of a non-
zero discount for deferral puts a greater relative value on the immediate age 65 
payments, and gives rise to a higher relativity. 
 The reduction to allow for maximum tax savings brings the deferral to an 
average of 124% under a zero discount, and to 135% under a 3% discount.  
Gender differences: averaging over SES differences and discount rate differences, the 
male early uptake relativity rate is 75% (the average over rows 1 & 2 and 5 & 6) 
and the female 76% (the average over rows 3 & 4 and 7 & 8); the male relativity 
is a little lower because male mortality falls off faster after age 65 than female 
mortality does and hence less value is available for early payment.  
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 Conversely, the relativity for males deferring to age 70 is 142%, compared to 
137% for females. (These drop to 131% and 128% respectively when maximum 
tax savings are allowed for.) While there is not a significant difference for 
taking NZS early, there is some difference for deferral; lower female mortality 
requires a lower relativity percentage for cost neutrality. 
 If just using the zero discount rate (ie rows 1 to 4 only), the early uptake 
relativities (ignoring SES effects) are 78% male, 80% female; for deferral they 
are 135% male, 131% female, or 126% and 123% respectively allowing for 
maximum tax saving. The use of a higher discount rate widens the relativities 
based on gender. 
SES differences: averaging over gender and discount rate differences, the low SES 
early uptake relativity is 74% (the average of rows 2, 4, 6 & 8), and the high 
SES 78% (the average of rows (1, 3, 5 & 7). The relativity is lower for the low 
SES group because they have more to gain from earlier access. 
 Conversely, the deferral relativity for low SES is 144%, while it is 135% for the 
high SES; allowing for tax advantage reduces these to 133% and 127% 
respectively (although the low SES case is perhaps not one where tax advantage 
will occur to any degree). The differentials here are quite marked, reflecting the 
fact that for the high SES group their lower mortality makes deferral relatively 
more costly. 
Gender and SES differences: focusing firstly on the zero discount case, and assuming 
maximum tax advantage enjoyed by deferral in the high SES case but not in the 
low SES case, the relativities are as tabulated below. 
 Table 2: relativities by gender and SES: zero discount 
Discount: 0% Male Female 
 
High SES Low SES High SES Low SES 
Early uptake (from age 60) 80% 77% 82% 78% 
Deferral (to age 70) 123% 138% 120% 134% 
 
 The range for early uptake is not insignificant, but given that it will be 
unattractive to high SES population but attractive to the low SES population, a 
relativity of around 77% of age 65 NZS may be equitable on average, although 
not necessarily fiscally neutral for reasons that will be discussed in the next 
section. Gender differences are apparent but could be considered of minor 
import. 
 Conversely, deferral is likely to be attractive to the high SES population and 
unattractive to the low SES population, so a relativity of around 122% of NZS 
would appear equitable. This would slightly favour females on average, 
although females may be marginally less able to get full tax advantages from 
deferral, given the gender wage gap. 
It could be argued that not all (both male and female) would enjoy the full tax 
advantage, but not to allow for tax saving to the greatest extent would advantage 
those on high incomes over others. Also, as noted in respect of early uptake, a 
deferral relativity of 122% would still not necessarily be fiscally neutral for 
reasons discussed in the next section. 
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Turning to the results obtained by employing a 3% discount, the relativities 
become: 
 Table 2: relativities by gender and SES: 3% discount 
Discount: 3% Male Female 
 
High SES Low SES High SES Low SES 
Early uptake (from age 60) 73% 69% 75% 71% 
Deferral (to age 70) 133% 153% 130% 149% 
 
Applying the same reasoning as above, the 3% discount results suggest an early 
uptake rate of around 70%, and deferral of around 132%. 
 
C: Conclusions from technical analysis  
Looking at the rates suggested in the Government discussion paper, the results for 
early uptake arrived at above from around 70% (3% pa discount over wage indexing) 
to 77% (0% discount over wage indexing) are not too far out of line with the 73% put 
forward in the paper. However the 160% proposed in the discussion paper for deferral 
to age 70 appears much too generous, and it is unclear how this figure could have 
been arrived at. The analysis here suggests something between 122% (0% discount 
over wage indexing) to 132% (3% pa discount over wage indexing). Even absence of 
any attempt to cost the tax advantage of deferral would still give a range of 129% to 
142%. 
In my view, the highest discount rate appropriate at the current time for costing 
relativities should not exceed 1% pa in excess of wage indexation; indeed there is an 
argument for no discount, so that relativities are then set by mortality considerations 
alone. Be that as it may, a relativity of 75% for early uptake and 125% for deferral 
could be supported as tentative best estimates assuming no selection effects other than 
in respect of SES group.  
An immediate implication is that responses to the discussion paper in favour of a 
deferral option based on a relativity of 160% will unfortunately be unreliable and of 
no utility from a policy development perspective. Were the discussion paper to have 
put forward the 125% that analysis here suggests, or even a tax favoured 130%, say, it 
seems likely that enthusiasm would be considerably muted. 
A less obvious but important implication is the need for Government to set aside 
contingency reserves on its balance sheet, should the proposal go ahead. There is 
clearly uncertainty in any “best estimate” of relativity and a private company would 
be required to hold regulatory capital sufficient to ensure promises to pay will be met 
in all reasonably foreseeable circumstances
10
.  
 
  
                                                        
10 Government will also need to record on its balance sheet  
1. A credit, under early uptake, for anticipated reduced NZS from age 65 in respect of those 
who elect that choice 
2. A debit, under deferral, for anticipated increased NZS from deferral age in respect of those 
who elect that choice 
This will be needed to ensure transparency of NZS cost. 
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Section 3: Outcomes and Fiscal Neutrality 
A: Rational behaviours 
When pricing options on which people can make voluntary choices, anyone from an 
insurance background will be very conscious of adverse selection. A customer for life 
insurance for example who is in poor health will get better than average value if they 
can obtain the insurance on normal terms. A person in very good health conversely 
may not consider life insurance worthwhile. 
In the section on technical issues I priced the early uptake option on the basis that it 
would appeal to low SES groups, and assumed a proxy mortality to get a rate which 
would be about right on average. However, consider a 60 year old diagnosed with 
Motor Neuron Disease (MND). Age 60 is a not uncommon onset age, and death 
before age 65 is almost a given in such circumstances. Someone in this position will 
opt for early uptake regardless of SES because they will get something rather than 
nothing.  
Fortunately MND is not that widespread. However, it illustrates the point that when 
people can make a voluntary choice on an option priced on an average, then choice 
will give rise to a bias against whoever is making the offer. Diagnosis of terminal 
illness in one’s early 60’s would almost invariably trigger exercise of an early uptake 
of NZS were it available, with no offset. 
As another example, suppose the deferral relativity was set higher than the cost-
neutral 125% arrived at above. Deferral would then become advantageous to those 
still in employment and earning over $70,000 pa, and the number of people who took 
advantage would be a direct additional cost on provision of NZS. 
In the case of insurance, companies underwrite applicants, in order to weed out the 
more extreme cases of adverse selection. It is difficult to see however how the 
Government can underwrite the offer of either early uptake or deferral. Even carrying 
out pricing on the basis of the subgroups most likely to take up the option, as I have 
done in the previous section, will not eliminate adverse selection. It follows then that 
the Government will inevitably lose money if people behave rationally, by which is 
meant: 
 Those who are broadly average for their group may or may not take up the option, 
depending on their circumstances 
 Those who have characteristics which make the offer poor value to them will not 
take it up 
 Those who have characteristics which make the offer of particular value to them 
will take it up 
If there was no choice, then one could average impacts out. But choice means that 
averages will not apply on the assumption of idiosyncratic risk variation and informed 
rational behaviour, and hence the Flexi-super proposal must add to the cost of NZS. 
If Flexi-super has other benefits, then the Government could carry out a cost-benefit 
analysis. This would however be a rather hypothetical exercise, and possibly comes 
into the “how long is a piece of string?” category of enquiry.  Whether loading 
additional costs onto NZS would ever be sensible must be doubtful when NZS cost 
pressures are increasing. Much better to deal directly with concerns, as outlined later 
in this paper. 
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B: Poor or constrained decision making 
The above discussion on choice has assumed rational agents, with a good knowledge 
of their own longevity prospects and high financial literacy. It is particularly 
necessary to focus on the early uptake choice with a different lens, because the target, 
the low SES group, are known to have poor financial literacy, at least on average. It is 
reasonably clear that a not insignificant number will fix on a guaranteed income to the 
exclusion of any other factors, including comfort in old age. Use of a low enough 
relativity for early uptake may result in broad fiscal neutrality in respect of NZS cost 
alone, but other welfare benefits will either have to rise, or greater poverty in old age 
become generally acceptable. 
And people who arrive at age 60 with no prospect of finding work, or indeed unable 
to work having been in arduous occupations and worn out (or poisoned in their work 
places as were some Bay of Plenty timber mill workers), will not really have options, 
but will feel compelled to exercise early uptake, in the absence of any other resource. 
This is not choice. 
A parallel is the case of Prison Service officers who used to have a separate section of 
the Government Superannuation Scheme. This section was compulsory, and required 
members to contribute 8.5% of their salary, in return for a pension from age 58 of 
1.875% of final average salary. In 1992 the then government made the scheme 
optional, allowing members to withdraw their own contributions plus meagre interest. 
At the same time subsidised rental housing was withdrawn. For most rank and file 
prison officers their GSF contribution became too onerous now that they had to pay 
market rents, and the lump sum was attractive – so they “chose” to withdraw. The 
number in the scheme fell from about 1,700 in 1989 to a little over 600 by 1994. For 
most this was a necessary but financially disadvantageous “decision”. 
One could not unreasonably argue that those who arrive at 60 with no reasonable 
prospects of work and no other resource deserve some better support than they obtain 
currently. But attempting to provide this by rearranging NZS provision is not giving 
meaningful choice. And it means we are abrogating our current policy of ensuring 
those over a certain age have enough to live on in order to participate in society at 
least to some extent.  
C: Individual v. financial discounting 
The technical section earlier identifies the significant effect of the discount rate in 
measuring value. The work of David Laibson and others has identified that many 
people (and not just lower SES groups) apply hyperbolic discounting; that is, a low 
discount for immediate payments, but a very high discount for later payments. For 
those who make financial judgements in this fashion, early uptake will appear very 
attractive even when not financially sensible from a more informed viewpoint. 
Deferral, on the other hand, unless at a fiscally ruinous relativity, will not be attractive 
even if, again, it would be financially sensible
11
. 
D: Other considerations 
It could be argued that not many people will exercise a choice away from age 65 
entitlement, and certainly this has been the experience of Australian and UK deferral 
arrangements. It could then be argued that the additional NZS costs described above 
may be insignificant in the scheme of things. 
                                                        
11
 This may explain the low take-up of deferral in the UK and Australia. 
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Whether or not experience in New Zealand will follow that in Australia and the UK 
will depend where relativities are set, especially for deferral. However, there will be 
significant fixed costs in establishing Flexi-super. Apart from the cost of putting it in 
place, including the legislative process, rate-setting mechanisms and accounting 
changes, there will need to be changes to payment systems to cater for different rates. 
The current Ministry of Social Development benefit payments system is efficient at 
what it does, but any change to what it is currently designed to do – such as more than 
three basic NZS rates – will be extremely expensive. A figure of $25 million used to 
be quoted; the cost is understood to be due to the need for exhaustive testing of 
changes since interdependencies within the system are imperfectly understood. 
It follows then that if there are only a few who exercise a choice under Flexi-super, 
the overhead cost per head will be considerable, and it may be questioned if this is a 
sensible use of taxpayer funds. 
 
Section 4: Alternatives 
A: Deferral 
If receiving NZS while working is seen as an issue for some, facilitating diversion of 
it into a KiwiSaver account would seem a low-cost option. Payments would be subject 
to PAYE as usual, and the accumulation uplifted when paid work ceases or reduces. 
Work and Income would need to offer the facility, and legislation may be needed to 
enable those who had attained age 65 without a KiwiSaver account to open one. 
(Whether or not a kickstart $1,000 would be available to anyone who had not already 
obtained one is worth consideration; there is an equity argument in favour.) 
The accumulation should be available to be taken on a draw-down basis, ie as regular 
non-taxable (as income) instalments until the money runs out. 
It may be that some in favour of Flexi-super have promoted it because it effectively 
provides additional, wage-indexed and Government-guaranteed annuity payments in 
return for those foregone payments. If such annuity provision is seen as desirable 
from a policy perspective, one would think it should be provided openly, rather than 
through some backdoor method, and subject to full scrutiny and regulation
12
. Be that 
as it may, some greater attention by government to the management of accumulated 
KiwiSaver funds does appear necessary, and no doubt will be a feature of the 
Retirement Commissioner’s forthcoming review of Retirement Income Policy.  
B: Early uptake 
There is good argument for greater resource to be provided for the worn-out and the 
structurally unemployable than is at present available. There is no obvious solution to 
that problem other than a targeted benefit at or around NZS levels, requiring higher 
taxes or diversion of other spending. 
However, for those with KiwiSaver balances, there is an argument for relaxing 
eligibility to some extent. Allowing payment of a regular monthly drawdown payment 
from age 60 or later when not in work would seem worth exploring. 
 
                                                        
12 As adverted to earlier, pricing can never expect to be accurate, and Government would need to set 
aside reserves on the same basis as private annuity companies. 
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Conclusion 
The basic problem with Flexi-super is that it attempts to apply a financial market 
mechanism to something for which financial market mechanisms are just not 
appropriate. As well as being wrong in principle, it inevitably causes difficulties for a 
Government in application, due to the impossibility of guaranteeing accurate pricing, 
the impacts of adverse selection, the absence of true choice for those with income 
constraints, and the likelihood of behaviours rather different from those assumed for 
economic rational agents.  
The opportunity to exercise “choice” is held as a benefit of the proposal, but in this 
instance “choice” is meaningless, unless one means (in the case of early uptake) 
choice between poverty now and poverty later, or (in both cases) the choice to 
exercise a financially advantageous option against the Government. The first of these 
is really still no choice at all, and the second will inevitably add to NZS cost with no 
other discernible benefit. 
If the main problem is receipt of NZS while still working, the paper puts forward a 
pragmatic solution that will not disrupt NZS and will increase the utility of 
KiwiSaver.  
If however the underlying problem is the absence of any opportunity to obtain 
additional, wage-indexed annuities, then note: 
 Wage-indexed annuities are just not practicable as financial market instruments 
 Annuity products generally are certainly desirable, but are very difficult to provide 
on a cost-neutral basis because of the tendency for individuals to apply hyperbolic 
discounting, making annuities appear unattractive on price. Also, for prudential 
reasons contingency reserves need to be established and held as segregated funds 
(whether provided publicly or privately)
13
, adding to cost 
It is not unreasonable to wonder why Flexi-super has been proposed at all. It will do 
nothing positive for lower SES groups, and will be of utility only to those in robust 
good health with sufficient private wealth that they can allocate part to increasing 
their state pension, to be underwritten by all taxpayers. One might suppose a certain 
myopia in those responsible for policy development, and at the least, a woeful lack of 
understanding of insurance principles. 
 
  
                                                        
13 The cost of holding contingency reserves necessarily has to be included in the annuity price, and 
hence products such as annuities deferred to a later age, by reducing uncertainty, are the most 
promising for investigation, since they require lower reserves. 
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Appendix 1: Formulae 
The annuity values have been calculated on the assumption of: 
 A set of rates q(x,t,s) of the probability of death within one year for a person 
exact age x at time t (t=0, 1, 2, … years) and SES s 
 Increases in payment each year of e compound 
 An investment return net of tax for discounting of r compound 
The amount of a payment each year, starting at 1, is given by 1, (1+e)^1, (1+e)^2, 
etc. 
The discount factors are given by 1/(1+r)^.5, 1/(1+r)^1.5, 1/(1+r)^2.5, etc, 
assuming reasonably continuous payment. 
The probability of survival to receive a payment in year t= 0, 1,2, etc is written as 
L(x+t+.5,s) / L(x,0,s) where L(x,0,s) is the opening number of lives, L(x,1,s) the 
number still alive at the end of year 1, Lx,2,s) the number still alive at the end of 
year 2, etc, and L(x+t+.5,s) = {L(x,t,s) + L(x,t+1,s)}/2.  
Values of L(x,t,s) are generated as follows: 
L(x,0,s) = 100,000 
L(x,1,s) = L(x,0,s) * (1-q(x,0,s)) 
L(x,2,s) = L(x,1,s) * (1-q(x+1,1,s)) 
etc 
where q(x+1,1,s)=q(x+1,0,s) * (1-d), q(x+2,2,s)=q(x+2,0,s) * (1-d)^2 and so on. 
 
The value of a basic tax wage indexed annuity of 1 pa from age 60 is given by  
{1/L(60,0,s)} * ∑L(60+t+.05) * (1+e)^t * 1/(1+r)^(t+.05), t=0 to 4514 which can 
be written as  
{(1+e)^-.5/L(60,0,s)} * ∑L(60+t+.05) * v^(t+.05), t=0 to 45  (1) 
where v = (1+r)/(1+e), and 1/v – 1 is the net discount rate. 
The value at age 60 of a basic tax wage indexed annuity of (1+e)^5 pa from age 65 
is given by  
{(1+e)^-.5/L(60,0,s)} * ∑L(60+t+.05) * v^(t+.05), t=5 to 45  (2) 
Note (2) is identical to (1) except that the first 5 terms are dropped.  
To allow for the effect of higher tax (33% in place of 11%) to age 70, the 
first five terms are multiplied by .67/.89.      
 (2A) 
Finally, the value at age 60 of a basic tax wage indexed annuity of (1+e)^10 pa 
from age 70 is given by  
{(1+e)^-.5/L(60,0,s)} * ∑L(60+t+.05) * v^(t+.05), t=10 to 45  (3) 
When calculating relativities, ie (2)/(1) for early uptake, (2)/(3) for deferral, and 
(2A)/(3) for deferral allowing for maximum tax, the (1+e)^-.5 term drops out. The 
annuity factors given in Appendix 2 have been calculated without the (1+e)^-.5 
term.  
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 The life tables stop at age 105 
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Appendix 2: Annuity Factors 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (2A) (3) 
Keep 
SES LE 
same D
is
co
u
n
t 
3
%
 
Male high SES 16.833 12.265 11.336 8.509 
Male low SES 14.477 10.010 9.150 6.531 
Female high SES 18.198 13.601 12.651 9.757 
Female low SES 15.380 10.877 9.998 7.320 
Increase 
SES LE 
D
is
co
u
n
t 
3
%
 
Male high SES 17.189 12.620 11.690 8.859 
Male low SES 14.252 9.786 8.929 6.318 
Female high SES 18.553 13.955 13.004 10.108 
Female low SES 15.156 10.654 9.777 7.108 
Keep 
SES LE 
same D
is
co
u
n
t 
0
%
 
Male high SES 24.801 19.889 18.732 15.208 
Male low SES 20.510 15.709 14.638 11.377 
Female high SES 27.592 22.648 21.463 17.856 
Female low SES 22.258 17.418 16.323 12.988 
Increase 
SES LE 
D
is
co
u
n
t 
0
%
 
Male high SES 25.663 20.750 19.592 16.063 
Male low SES 20.066 15.267 14.200 10.949 
Female high SES 28.497 23.553 22.367 18.757 
Female low SES 21.821 16.983 15.891 12.567 
 
Results shown here include the mortality improvement case where the absolute 
decrease was held constant, resulting in a widening of the life expectancy gap by SES. 
As noted, relativities were very little different from the case where relative mortality 
improvements were taken to maintain the current (period) life expectancy gap at age 
65, requiring a slightly greater improvement for the lower SES group, and it is the 
latter results that are reported upon in the paper. 
 
 
